# Sarita Rosenstock

### **University of Melbourne**

The Categorical Connection Between Geometric and Algebraic Formulations of GR



Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics



Volume 52, Part B, November 2015, Pages 309-316

# On Einstein algebras and relativistic spacetimes

Sarita Rosenstock a 🖂 , Thomas William Barrett b 🖂 , James Owen Weatherall a 🝳 🖂

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### Abstract

In this paper, we examine the relationship between <u>general relativity</u> and the theory of Einstein algebras. We show that according to a formal criterion for theoretical equivalence recently proposed by <u>Halvorson</u>, 2012, <u>Halvorson</u>, 2015 and <u>Weatherall</u> (2015a), the two are equivalent theories.

Commun. math. Phys. 26, 271–275 (1972) © by Springer-Verlag 1972

### Einstein Algebras

ROBERT GEROCH The Enrico Fermi Institute, Chicago, Illinois, USA

Received January 31, 1972

Abstract. An approach to quantization of general relatively using a reformulation of the classical theory in which the events of space-time play essentially no role is discussed.

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{Manifold } M \mapsto \mathbb{R}\text{-algebra } C^{\infty}(M) = \{f: M \to \mathbb{R}\} \\ \text{derivation on } M = \mathbb{R}\text{-linear map } \hat{X} : C^{\infty}(M) \to C^{\infty}(M) \\ \text{s.t. } \forall f, g \in C^{\infty}(M), \hat{X}(f \circ g) = f \circ \hat{X}(g) = g \circ \hat{X}(f) \\ \\ \end{array}$ 

 $\Rightarrow$  module of derivations  $\mathscr{D}$  and dual module  $\mathscr{D}^*$ 

 $\Rightarrow$  metric  $g: \mathscr{D} \to \mathscr{D}$  symmetric module isomorphism

+ Ricci tensor, Riemann tensor, etc.

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### Abstract

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**Graduate Texts in Mathematics** 



|A| = "points" of A =

"smooth" homomorphisms  $\hat{x}:A
ightarrow\mathbb{R}$ 

 $\hat{x}(f) \leftrightarrow f(x)$ 

 $\rightarrow$  Topology on A

 $\rightarrow$  Conditions on topological algebra to construct manifold


 $\rightarrow$  + Algebraic definitions of derivations & tensor fields

#### Jet Nestruev

# Smooth Manifolds and Observables

Second Edition





# Manifold + Metric

Einstein Algebra

Categorical relationship between theories


**Q:** Do  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  have "the same" content, or does one involve stronger ontological commitments than the other?


[some category theory]

A: The physically relevant relationship between  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  is that  $T_1$  has [more/less/the same] [structure/properties/stuff] compared to  $T_2$ .

# Category (of models)

### Category (of models)






**Q:** Do  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  have "the same" content, or does one involve stronger metaphysical commitments than the other?


- 1.  $T_1$  can be understood as category  $\mathbf{C}_1$ .
- 2.  $T_2$  can be understood as category  $\mathbf{C}_2$ .
- 3. The relationship between  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  can be understood as a functor  $F: \mathbb{C}_1 \to \mathbb{C}_2$ .
- 4. *F* has xyz properties.


### from which we infer

A: The physically relevant relationship between  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  is that  $T_1$  has [more/less/the same]

structure/properties/stuff compared to  $T_2$ .









If a functor is full, faithful, and essentially surjective, it realizes an equivalence of categories.

### **Heuristic:**

- not essentially surjective = forgets "properties"
- → not full = forgets "structure"
- → not faithful = forgets "stuff"

### Origin of PSS Heuristic

POST REPLY

С



11/13/98



#### Toby Bartels

☆ Just Categories now (Was: Symplectic forms and Categories)

#### John Baez <ba...@galaxy.ucr.edu> wrote parenthetically:

>l will

>leave it to James Dolan to explain the technical distinction between >"extra properties", "extra structure", and "extra stuff" - there is >a nice category-theoretic way of making this precise.

#### Ooh, let me guess!

Given a functor U: C -> D, interpret U as a forgetful functor. Then C is D with extra \*structure\* if U is surjective on the objects and, given a pair of objects, injective on the morphisms between them; and C is D with extra \*properties\* if U is injective on the morphisms (meaning injective on the objects and on the morphisms between a given pair); Otherwise, I guess C is just D with extra \*stuff\* if, given a pair of objects, U is injective on the morphisms between them.

For example, the forgetful functor Groups -> Sets shows that groups are sets with extra structure, while the forgetful functor Abelian Groups -> Groups shows that Abelian groups are groups with extra properties. Or you can turn around and use the free functor Sets -> Groups and say that sets are groups with extra properties (to wit, the property of being free). OTOH, the Abelianization functor Groups -> Abelian groups is surjective on the objects (and on the morphisms for that matter), but groups are not Abelian groups with extra structure, because the functor isn't injective on the morphisms between a given pair.

-- Toby

to...@ugcs.caltech.edu


Inspiration for PSS

"Mathematical gadgets" can be defined by specifying

Some stuff: set(s), space(s),


Equipped with structure: subset(s), elements, relations

Satisfying properties: equations, inequalities, inclusions



# **Ex:** forgetting structure

 $Category\, {\bf Sq}$ 




Arrows: 90°, 180°, 270° rotations; reflections over hor, vert, and diag axes


# **Ex:** forgetting structure

Category **Sq** Category **Sq**\* **Object: Object:** Arrows: 90°, 180°, 270° Arrows: 180° rotation; rotations; reflections hor & vert reflection over hor, vert, and diag axes


# **Ex:** forgetting structure




# **Ex:** forgetting stuff



# **Ex:** forgetting properties







Intuitive significance of PSS

forgetting properties  $\rightarrow$  expanding scope

forgetting stuff  $\rightarrow$  reducing dimension

forgetting structure  $\rightarrow$  adding noise or eliminating artifacts

Category Man

**Objects:** 

Manifolds with metric

### Category EA

### **Objects:**

"Smooth" algebras + "metric"


### Arrows:

Metric preserving diffeomorphisms of the manifold

### Arrows:

"Smooth" isomorphisms that preserve "metric"


Functor  $F: Man \rightarrow EA$  is an equivalence of categories





# Manifold + Metric


Einstein Algebra


Problem: Which categories & functors




















The intuitive general idea of a colimit is that it defines an object obtained by sewing together the objects of the diagram, according to the instructions given by the morphisms of the diagram.


# nLab























# Manifold + Metric

Einstein Algebra

### Summary

Category theory provides a scaffold for telling a story about the relationship between theoretic formalisms that is constrained to be consistent with how we use them.

- Categories offer a precise way of (provisionally) defining a formalism
- Functors express relationships between formalisms
- Semantic diagrams express how we are interpreting formalisms
- **PSS heuristic** summarises key features of the proposed relationships between formalisms *as interpreted*

# Thanks!

# Any questions?

